Life is Priceless

OR NOT …

Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. — John 15:13 (KJV)

In this context, I believe the designation of “friends” as a class and in the plural is not irrelevant or inadvertent. It represents the classic utilitarian belief that one might be sacrificed for the benefit of many, but a sacrifice for the benefit of “friends” would tend to indicate a collective of persons similarly situated with shared beliefs and inclined to mutual sacrifices (i.e. a “tribe”).

While the sentiment is no doubt true and represents a worthy moral ideal, what if the sacrifice is for the benefit of a single “particular” friend or loved one? Does the same motivation toward self-sacrifice exist for ANY “friend”? How about not a friend but a complete stranger? The sacrifice is no less noble, perhaps even more so, but most persons would admit that the motivation is less if it were for some anonymous member of the human race as opposed to a close friend, family member, or child. Is one less moral or even “immoral” if he is disinclined to make such a sacrifice similarly and equally for the benefit of any and all?

Is the quality of the past or future lives of either party a consideration (or should it be)? Should one sacrifice a life of demonstrated benefit and maximized potential for one of questionable utility or even potentially detrimental (to the individual or to society)? Should past or future duration of the life saved or benefited be a factor? Is one likely to be more inclined to sacrifice his own life for the benefit of an innocent babe versus a sickly octogenarian? Regardless of current age, what if it were known that the life “saved” would end (by unrelated causes) a year (or month, week, day, hour, or second) later?

Given that everyone will eventually die and no life is ever “saved” (but only extended or prevented from ending “prematurely”), what is the actual, relative, or marginal “value” or “benefit” as measured in the lives sacrificed and saved?

There is an oft repeated statement or sentiment, which I would offer is almost always insincere or at least poorly considered: If it [i.e. some proposed course of action] saves just one life, then it’s worth doing!

There are acts, which require only modest effort or costs, that most, if not all, persons would agree are “worth doing” if they “save” a single life from a premature death. However, not all acts, which arguably or potentially marginally extend the life of an individual are worthy of the personal efforts, financial resources, and collective sacrifices, which might be required to achieve the desired effect(s).

For example, the average cost of the Polio vaccine is $100 per course of treatment, and its administration has resulted in the near eradication of that terribly debilitating and life-threatening disease. Since the disease primarily affected children under age 5, no one could reasonably argue against the cost-benefit of such a treatment. However, what if the treatment cost $1,000 or $10,000 or even $100,000, as is the cost today of some specialized pharmaceuticals?

What if the benefit was not in allowing a young child the opportunity for a full and healthy life, but was in extending the life of a cancer ravaged older adult by a single year (month, week, or day)?

I am confident that most persons would concede that $100 for an expected lifetime measured in decades is “reasonable,” but some similar number of persons are likely to agree that $100,000 to extend life a single day would be “unreasonable” (especially if they had to foot the bill personally).

So what began as a “moral” ideal eventually breaks down into a cost-benefit analysis. Who then is privileged to undertake such an analysis? I would argue that whoever bears the costs also determines the reasonableness of the resulting benefits. (i.e. He who writes the checks makes the rules.)

There is a fundamental problem when the parties, who receive the benefits, are unrelated (or only ostensibly related) to other parties, who are required to bear the costs (involuntarily). Absent the relationship between costs and benefits, beneficiaries are likely to deem any costs reasonable (or any efforts worthy) so long as someone else must bear the resulting burdens. Where the beneficiaries are privileged to compel the contributions or sacrifice by force of law (e.g. taxation or conscription), the end result is likely to be self-serving as opposed to being motivated by some “moral” obligation. It becomes institutional theft, as opposed to charity. Justice Antonin Scalia said, “The transformation of charity into legal entitlement has produced donors without love and recipients without gratitude.”

Moral certainty must give way to a subjective perspective regarding an imperfect reality. But, what of the argument that “a single life [of any duration and of any quality] is worth any price or effort [to be paid or expended by any unrelated individual or the collective generally even if contribution must be compelled]”?

Like many socio-political arguments, which are presented by proponents as moral imperatives, the “one life” argument is not intended to advance a position based upon rationality or reason. Instead, its express purpose is to squelch debate and to limit discussion on a matter when proponents likely would concede that all other arguments would not be controlling or convincing.

The entire “social justice” mindset represents an attempt by a self-serving “collective” to impose a “value” or worth on one’s life and the fruits of his labors, which may be independent of and irrelevant to the value that one would place on those things himself. While one can potentially price himself out of any market, the benefit of participation and exchange almost inevitably motivates a party to accept a price, which can and will be borne by the market, even if he does so reluctantly.

The alternative is to force parties to engage in transactions or relationships, which they deem disadvantageous, and to submit their wealth, the fruits of their labors, that labor itself, and ultimately their own lives to the arbitrary notions and self-serving whims of the collective. Almost by definition, the resulting transactions are “imbalanced.” In the presence of mutuality of benefit, contribution, and commitment, the market participants would establish voluntary relationships, and government action would be unnecessary (i.e. superfluous or even counterproductive). Regardless, if the collection of all such transactions represent consistently losing propositions, the collective is ultimately worse off.

Experience may demonstrate and history may establish that either or both the individual or the collective may have benefited better from a course of action different than one chosen by individuals; however, that is the inherent nature of life generally. It is fundamental to life that the individual be free to live the single life that he is afforded as he chooses so as to enjoy the benefits of his actions and choices while concurrently suffering the consequences of the same. The hope is for a life on the whole where the benefits outweigh the costs, but that is never guaranteed. However, the combined benefits from net producers must exceed the cumulative costs from net consumers, or else, the well eventually runs dry. An inefficient and ineffective society is an obsolete society, which ultimately will cease to exist.

No life can be lived without cost or consequence. Without risk, there is unlikely to be reward. One should not be privileged to command from another something, for which no commensurate price is paid. It is only when the relationship is maintained between costs and benefits that reasoned objectives can be set and priorities established.

That is not to say that all opportunities will be equal or that all choices will be right and proper, but only the individual is in a position to define his own objectives and priorities. Only the individual can make a meaningful cost-benefit analysis about utilizing or sacrificing that which is his, including his life and the fruits of his labors. Nothing is more singular or unique as an individual’s life. The right, responsibility, obligation and burden related to the manner, in which that life is lived, rest solely with the individual.

One cannot abandon his responsibilities and obligations without also surrendering his opportunities and freedom. In such instances, one’s life is no longer his own. Similarly, the collective, inclusive of the state and government, cannot legitimately usurp the life of another or the benefits attributable to his living. Selflessness and altruism may be valued as being beneficial to other persons or to the collective, but it is the individual, who pays the price or who endures the sacrifice and who determines the reasonableness of the transaction. Any other arrangement or compelled transaction is institutional theft … involuntary servitude … or tantamount to murder.