Equally Repugnant
Derek Parfit postulated the “Repugnant Conclusion,” which I paraphrase as:
If it is better to have higher average happiness over a larger population, then ultimately it is best to have a very large population with very low levels of happiness. Parfit himself deemed this conclusion “repugnant.”
Many social and political arguments today turn on the issue of which party, preferred class, or interest group receives the (perceived) “benefit” from a proposed policy, program, or government action and whether that beneficiary or some class of “others” properly bears the (anticipated) costs, or associated sacrifices. In the situation where one party receives the benefit but another party pays the costs or incurs a concurrent sacrifice, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to perform a meaningful and effective cost-benefit analysis.
Some persons prefer to work in a manner, by which they derive benefit (i.e. produce) for themselves (a limited population). Others contend that those efforts are more “moral” if the derived benefits are allocated to one or more “needy” (less “fulfilled”) persons (i.e. spread over some larger population). In the latter scenario, the objective is relative “equality.” However, it is impossible to have equal sharing of benefits and excesses. The only possible “equality” comes in the reduction of everyone and everything to the Lowest Common Denominator. In the end, the people may be more equal, but they are more equal in loss, disappointment, and misery.
Ignoring for the moment the issue of whether a producer will produce at the same levels (or maximally) if the benefits of his efforts (i.e. the fruits of his labors) flow to parties other than himself, there is another issue:
If there is a unit of benefit produced, and the producer, who already possesses a unit of benefit, gives that additional unit (or is required to give it by force of law in the form of a tax) to another person, then the would-be beneficiary has been “equally” benefited. Many would argue that the transfer is morally justified, or even compelled. The (charitable) benefit is easy enough to identify, but it can be argued that there is a detriment to the collective. The societal collective may incur an opportunity cost. What if the producer has the ability to invest that additional unit of benefit (i.e. wealth), so as to produce two more (2) units in the future? Is it better (or more “moral”) for the producer to distribute the single unit currently, or to hold onto it, and in the future, be able to keep an additional new unit and give another away (or to give two (2) new units away should he be charitably inclined)?[1]
How about if the unit is divisible: Is it better to give fractional units to more than one person, and if so, is there a point, at which the fractional “benefit” to a larger number of persons is so small as to be futile? If you take an executive’s $1,000,000 salary and (re)distribute it among 100,000 employees, the individual benefit is $10. The individuals are incrementally better off, but is society or the collective materially improved? If there is diminished benefit and the benefits continue to be divided and (re)distributed, then the collective is ultimately diminished by the costs of production, distribution, and lost opportunity costs.
Should the overall objective be an increased level of benefit (i.e. value, happiness, wealth, etc.) within the collective (or some segment thereof) or should the objective be equality at all costs, even if that means subsistence level existence for everyone and a material decrease in the accumulated benefits within the collective, as a whole?
As a practical matter, the producer is not likely to engage in maximal production if the net benefit to him does not exceed the costs of production (and at least match the perceived benefit to be derived from alternative uses of the producer’s time and resources). Similarly, the collective should not promote behaviors or activities, which decrease the overall value or benefit within the collective.
Upon full analysis, most persons would likely deem such vain and fruitless acts to be “repugnant.” However, the determination of whether the retained or distributed benefits are “worthwhile” is entirely subjective. Would-be beneficiaries are likely to deem any incremental benefit “worthwhile” (or even “necessary”) so long as the costs or resulting sacrifices are to be borne by some unrelated or disfavored class of “others” (e.g. the nebulously defined “Rich” or the much-maligned “One Percent”). However, producers ultimately will make the cost-benefit decision related to production of the benefit (or the utilization of resources necessary to secure the benefit).
As esoteric as these concepts may seem, they are among the questions and issues that, either consciously or subconsciously, play out as these matters are considered by individuals and debated within society.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/
[1] If the recipient of the benefit is truly “needy,” it is most likely that he will immediately expend and exhaust the benefit (i.e. asset or resource) rather than having a similar or equal opportunity to maximize the value of the potential investment. Resources that are immediately consumed cannot be invested or made productive in the hands of the consumer. Investible or productive assets require the existence of “wealth.” Wealth might be defined as excess resources, which can be invested and put at risk of loss with a potential or anticipated return on the investment (relative to the associated risk).
